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"just circles and circles of sorrow"1
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Essay I explore the relationship between being a feminist and
representing men on death row. It is appropriate to engage in this in-
quiry in considering how the law has developed in the twenty-five years
since Furman v. Georgia.2 During that time both Furman and the advent
of feminist legal theory have required a restructuring in the way we think
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University. J.D., 1985, Northeastern University School of Law. While I have been
thinking about the issues raised in this Essay for many years, several individuals provided
valuable suggestions as I translated my thoughts into writing. I am grateful to Linda L.
Ammons, Jeffrey Alan Coryell, Karen Engle, Patricia J. Falk, Kunal Parker, and Elizabeth
M. Schneider. I also thank my research assistants, Rebecca Felmly, Shari A. Slawinski, and
Jennifer L. Whitney, for their persistence in identifying and locating reference materials.
1. TONI MORRISON, SULA 149 (Plume 1982) (1973).
2. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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about two fundamental legal questions: for death penalty jurisprudence,
how and why we sentence an individual to death; and for feminist juris-
prudence, how the law views crimes of violence against women. The rela-
tionship between these two developments becomes apparent when we
consider the appropriateness of the death penalty for a man who mur-
dered a woman in the course of a sexually violent felony or as part of a
history of abuse. For many feminists, the focus is on the crime and insur-
ing that the punishment acknowledges the gravity of the harm inflicted
upon the female victim. For those defending a man in these circum-
stances, the crime, as it informs the punishment decision, is of less impor-
tance than explaining the background and character of the defendant.
While these two positions may appear to conflict, this Essay will examine
their similarities.
This Essay grows out of my own experience confronting a particular
question: "How can a feminist represent a man who was convicted and
sentenced to death for murdering a woman he sexually assaulted and/or
toward whom he was abusive?" I focus on the question of representing
men who battered their partners because that is the context in which I
was faced with this dilemma.3 The dissonance for a feminist occurs be-
cause, on the one hand, the law has for so long trivialized women's expe-
rience of being battered,4 and on the other hand, she is asked, as a lawyer,
to defend a man whose actions exemplify the very real consequences a
battered woman faces.5 Thus, when the State seeks the most extreme
punishment for a man charged with killing a woman he physically abused,
it provides a reason to feel vindicated because the State is demonstrating
3. See infra Section II. This issue is a particularly poignant one for me because prior
to representing men on death row I worked in a battered women's shelter and wrote an
article about the legitimacy of battered women's self-defense claims. See generally Phyllis
L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121 (1985).
My conclusions about how a feminist may begin to understand a man on death row who
battered and killed his partner may also apply to thinking about a man who rapes and kills
a woman. For example, a similarity exists in the way that our culture addresses the prob-
lem of rape and battery as a legal issue after the fact, rather than as a social problem to be
prevented in the first place. However, I also recognize that differences may exist that alter
this analysis. For example, the repetitive nature of abuse may give the social service and
legal systems the opportunity to address the problem in ways that are different from the
singular circumstances of rape. Considering these differences is beyond the scope of this
Essay.
4. See infra Section III.A.
5. While my remarks focus on the question of a feminist lawyer representing a man on
death row, they are equally applicable to any feminist for whom this issue is problematic.
An important difference, however, is that the feminist lawyer cannot avoid the conflict
because it will affect her representation of her client. See infra Section II.
[Vol. 29:981
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that it takes seriously the problem of violence against women.6 To then
ask a feminist to represent the defendant creates a conflict between ap-
proving of the State's strong response to the violence against the woman,
and yet, in defending the man who committed that violence, fighting
6. Not all men who physically abuse and kill their partners may be charged with capi-
tal murder. The death penalty is only available as a punishment for certain aggravated
first-degree murders, for example, a murder that occurred in the course of a felony such as
an aggravated sexual assault, or where more than one person was murdered, or a murder
for hire. See, e.g., TEX. PEN. CODE § 19.03(a) (Vernon 1994). A relatively small portion of
the men on death row murdered someone with whom they were intimately involved. See
Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount. A Study of Capital Do-
mestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1517 (1996) (reporting in her
study comparing the crimes of men on death row in six states, that only 12% of them killed
an intimate which included kin and sexual intimates while nearly one-half of those men
killed a woman in retaliation for leaving the relationship). Based on a review of the state
court decisions for the 372 men on death row in Texas as of July 1997, only 4 appeared to
have killed a wife or girlfriend, but in each case the killing occurred after the woman sepa-
rated from the man. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, DEATH Row, U.S.A. 1, 41-44
(Summer 1997); see also Eldridge v. State, 940 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en
banc) (murdering ex-girlfriend and her daughter); Broussard v. State, 910 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) (slaying his wife and their son, after she left him because he
beat her); Alba v. State, 905 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) (killing wife who
had fled and was staying with neighbors); Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992) (en banc) (murdering his former girlfriend and three of her siblings). Notably,
one of the early United States Supreme Court death penalty cases involved an abusive
husband who murdered his wife and mother-in-law after his wife left him. Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 424-26 (1980); see Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the
Domestic Discount. A Study of Capital Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU
L. REV. 1507, 1519 (1996) (discussing Godfrey as an example of courts not treating seri-
ously domestic murder). The small percentage of domestic murder cases is part of the
larger phenomenon that those who kill strangers are much more likely to be sentenced to
death than those who kill non-strangers. See SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO,
DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION 48 (1989) (reporting that in Georgia one who kills a stranger
is ten times more likely to be sentenced to death, Florida, four times, and Illinois, six
times).
The significance of the relationship between the men who murder and the women they
murder has been rarely explored. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing:
Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 94-114 (1992)
(analyzing how law on wife-murder, e.g., heat of passion murders, fails to incorporate mod-
ern understandings about wife battering). Similarly, only a few authors have focused on
the cultural and political significance of the fact that primarily men, not women, commit
sexual serial murders. See DEBORAH CAMERON & ELIZABETH FRAZER, THE LUST To
KILL passim (1987) (analyzing how the cultural and scientific discourse on sex-killers is
unsatisfactory because it ignores the gender of the killers); JANE CAPUTI, THE AGE OF SEX
CRIME passim (1987) (providing a feminist analysis of sexualized serial killers); Michael
Mello, On Metaphors, Mirrors, and Murders: Theodore Bundy and the Rule of Law, 18
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 887, 925-36 (1990-91) (discussing how the cultural depic-
tion of serial killer Theodore Bundy did not include the relevance of the fact that all of his
victims were women).
1998] ESSAY
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against the ultimate punishment. The challenge arises in understanding
that representing such a defendant does not discount the very real horror
faced by women who are physically abused by their partners.
I posit that the answer to this dilemma lies in recognizing the interrelat-
edness of two factors, one personal and the other political. The phrase
"the personal is the political" is at the heart of what feminism is about:
What occurs to a woman on a personal level is not merely individual but
informed by and part of political, social, and cultural beliefs and forces.7
Thus, when a man repeatedly batters his wife, it is not simply a private
matter arising out of their unique circumstances, but instead reflects a
broader dynamic of the relationship between men and women in this cul-
ture and the way the law responds to that situation.
The fusion between personal experience and its political/social context
carries over to the death penalty. Representing a man on death row is
intensely personal for me as a lawyer, but more important, it is personal
because it is about the life of the defendant, the woman he killed, and the
circumstances surrounding the crime. These factors also make it very
political because how the defendant came to be the person who commit-
ted this kind of murder, and why he is on death row, are intimately af-
fected by the social and legal policies of this country.
Understanding the inseparability of the personal and the political al-
lows me to reconcile two seemingly incompatible phenomena: outrage at
the defendant for committing the murder, and compassion for the de-
fendant when considering his deserved punishment. This Essay describes
how I reached this point of reconciliation. I begin by explaining the cir-
cumstances under which I was first confronted with the dilemma of repre-
senting a man on death row for murders that involved sexual violence as
well as a history of abuse against a woman. I then consider the connec-
tions between feminism and representing men on death row by exploring
what death penalty jurisprudence and feminist legal theory teach us
about how the law acknowledges individual stories of violence. I contend
7. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
119-20 (1989) (stating "The personal as political is not a simile, not a metaphor, and not an
analogy. It does not mean that what occurs in personal life is similar to, or comparable
with, what occurs in the public arena.... It means that women's distinctive experience as
women occurs within that sphere that has been socially lived as the personal-private,
emotional, interiorized, particular, individuated, intimate-so that what it is to know the
politics of women's situation is to know women's personal lives, particularly women's sex-
ual lives."); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from
the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 602-03 (1986) (explaining that the phrase
'the personal is political' "reflects the view that the realm of personal experience, the 'pri-
vate' which has always been trivialized, particularly for women, is an appropriate and im-
portant subject of public inquiry, and that the 'private' and 'public' worlds are inextricably
linked").
[Vol. 29:981
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that each shows us the necessity of placing both the woman's experience
of battering and the man's perpetration of abuse and murder in the
broader social and legal context of how our society addresses, or fails to
address, family violence. I conclude that together they demonstrate not
only the inadequacy of the criminal justice system's response to family
violence, but, more important, the dire need to reorder our social and
legal priorities so that they emphasize prevention more than punishment.
By focusing on these fundamental issues, we may begin to uncover the
similarities rather than the conflicts between the way the law responds to
female victims of violent crimes and to men on death row who committed
some of those crimes.
II. PERSONAL STORIES ABOUT DEATH AND VIOLENCE
I begin with the story of my first client at the Texas Resource Center. s
Mario Marquez was on death row for the aggravated sexual assault and
murder of his niece and wife.9 Initially, these minimal facts were enough
to make me question whether I could effectively represent Marquez.
Based on my feminist beliefs, I was predisposed to fault him. Since I was
new to the death penalty practice, I was just beginning to understand the
import of Justice Stewart's statement that every murder could be charac-
terized as "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman,"' 0 the
question is, which defendants are deserving of death instead of life im-
prisonment as the appropriate punishment." That distinction is impor-
tant in death penalty jurisprudence, and it was critical to me as I began
representing Marquez. Over the next two years I learned more about the
crime Marquez committed, but I also learned a great deal more about
8. I was a staff attorney at the Texas Resource Center in Austin, Texas from 1989 to
1994. The Texas Resource Center was a federally-funded community public defender of-
fice charged with ensuring that all individuals on death row in Texas were represented in
their post-conviction appeals.
9. Technically, Marquez was on death row for murdering, in the course of an aggra-
vated sexual assault, his fourteen-year-old niece, and not his wife. Marquez v. State, 725
S.W.2d 217, 220-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc). I assume that the State did not seek
the death penalty against Marquez for killing his wife because, at the time of these
murders, it was not a crime to sexually assault one's wife. See John Schmolesky, Criminal
Law, 38 SOUTHWETERN L.J. 497, 521-22 (1984) (explaining that when Texas modified its
sexual offense statutes in 1983, it retained the spousal exemption for aggravated sexual
assault). Thus, although he sexually assaulted and murdered his wife, it did not qualify as a
capital murder. See TEX. PEN. CODE § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1994) (defining capital murder
to include murder in the course of aggravated sexual assault). This situation is a vivid
example of the law discounting the seriousness of sexual violence against a spouse.
10. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980).
11. See id. at 427-28 (commenting that a capital sentencing scheme must provide a
basis for distinguishing between cases where death is imposed and where it is not).
1998]
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Marquez that bore directly on the question of whether the death penalty
was his proper punishment.
Mario Marquez was a Mexican-American raised on the far south side
of San Antonio, Texas.'2 He was the tenth of sixteen children in a family
that worked as migrant farm workers for parts of every year. He was
mildly mentally retarded and brain damaged. As a child, his father regu-
larly and severely physically abused him: he beat him with hammers, 2 x
4 boards, and extension cords, and strung him up like a pifiata over a tree
limb, whipping him until he lost consciousness. Marquez's siblings de-
scribed him as receiving the brunt of their father's abuse. Marquez rarely
attended school-he often missed one-half of a year due to migrant work,
and even when in town he would miss many days. The elementary
schools did not address Marquez's mental retardation. Rather than being
taught to read, he was given a coloring book. Throughout his education
he received failing grades. He was held back in third grade, socially pro-
moted from sixth to seventh grade, and then dropped out.
When Marquez was twelve, both of his parents abandoned him and his
five younger siblings. Marquez then began using drugs heavily, including
inhaling toxic spray paint every day for the next twelve years. Undoubt-
edly, the drugs were a way of trying to cope with the pain of desertion
and the overwhelming responsibility of being left in charge. His father
continued to beat Marquez when, on a random basis, he would return to
the house with bags of groceries. If the house was in disrepair, Marquez's
father would beat him. After the children were alone in the house for a
year, the police took the younger siblings to a shelter and eventually they
12. The facts pertaining to the Marquez case have been compiled from the following
sources of information, which are on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal: Testimony by
family, neighbors, and mental health experts at an evidentiary hearing, Ex parte Marquez,
No. 84-CR-0905-W2 (226th Dist. Ct., Bexar County, Tex. Aug. 13-17, 1990); Robert
Geffner, Ph.D., Neuropsychological and Psychological Evaluation; Mary F. Smith, Social
History Evaluation; Interviews with Mario Marquez at Ellis Unit One, in Huntsville, Tex.
(Sept. 9, 1989 through Apr. 1992); Interview with Rosalinda Avila and Mary Trevino in San
Antonio, Tex. (Nov. 18, 1989); Interview with Albert Casillas in San Antonio, Tex. (July 23,
1990); Interview with Virginia Marquez in San Antonio, Tex. (Nov. 28, 1989); Interview
with Nicholas Marquez in San Antonio, Tex. (Dec. 11, 1989); Interview with Antonio Mar-
quez in San Antonio, Tex. (Dec. 11, 1989); Interview with Epifanio Marquez in San
Antonio, Tex. (Dec. 4, 1989); Interview with Deacon Forencio Moreno in San Antonio,
Tex. (Aug. 7, 1990); Interview with Elida Vasquez in San Antonio, Tex. (Dec. 3, 1989); and
author's review of the Bexar County District Attorney's file in State v. Marquez (No.
84-CR-0905). See also Ex parte Marquez, No. 84-CR-0905 (226th Dist. Ct., Bexar
County, Tex. Dec. 10, 1990) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on Appli-
cant's Second Petition for Post Conviction Writ of Habeas Corpus, at 2-6 (onl file with the
St. Mary's Law Journal).
[Vol. 29:981
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went to live with older siblings. Marquez, now thirteen, continued to live
alone in the house.
Marquez began living with a series of women after he turned seven-
teen. Over the next nine years he lived with three women in a row, and
considered each one his common-law wife. He married the last, Rebecca,
whom he later killed. Marquez had children with the first two women.
His second common-law wife told me Marquez beat her; police reports
documented repeated calls to the house for "family disturbances" during
the time Marquez lived with his second and third wives. His second wife
reported that Marquez pushed her out of a speeding car and then drag-
ged her for several hundred yards as she held on to the door. According
to Marquez, the night he killed Rebecca and his niece, Rebecca told him
she was leaving him for another man. I believe that, at this moment,
Marquez lost complete emotional and psychological control. The woman
he married was abandoning him, just like his parents had. This brain-
damaged, mentally retarded individual did not have the skills to respond
to this information in any rational or otherwise appropriate manner.
I uncovered this story by talking to my client and his mother, father,
siblings, family friends, employer, and priest, and by reading a host of
school, police, and hospital records. Each provided a piece of the story
about Marquez's life. He had an unimaginable and horrific existence-
there is no other way to describe it. 3
Since I was preparing a petition for writ of habeas corpus that would
raise claims about the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence, my
investigation included not only learning about my client's life, but also
the State's case against him. One morning, I drove from Austin to San
Antonio to review the district attorney's files. One file contained pictures
of the crime scene, of Rebecca Marquez, age thirty-two, and of Rachel
Gutierrez, his fourteen-year-old niece. I thought about not looking at the
pictures, about not giving in to my curiosity, that lurid fascination we
have but do not always like to admit. I reasoned that the pictures were
13. None of this information was presented to the jury at his capital murder trial. At
the time of Marquez's trial the Texas death penalty statute limited the jury to considering
evidence as it related to the two questions the jury had to answer at the penalty phase: was
the defendant's conduct deliberate and is it probable he will commit violent acts in the
future. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 310 (1989) (citing the Texas statute). A "yes"
answer to both questions resulted in a death sentence for the defendant. Several years
after Marquez's trial the United States Supreme Court recognized that in certain situa-
tions, where the defendant presented evidence such as childhood abuse or mental retarda-
tion, these questions prevented the jury from considering the mitigating aspects of this kind
of evidence. See id. at 322-28. Nonetheless, the effect at the time of trial was that defense
attorneys frequently did not present such evidence because it would provide "yes" answers
to the two questions, id. at 322-27, adversely sealing their client's fate.
1998] ESSAY
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not why I was there-they were relevant to Marquez's guilt, which was
not really in dispute, but the pictures were not relevant to his punish-
ment. But, of course, they were important to my understanding of the
crime for which he was sentenced to death. The pictures were simply,
and shockingly, pictures of the double murder my client had committed;
so I looked at them.
I fought having any kind of emotional reaction. When reading death
penalty cases I usually avoided dwelling on the facts of the crime. Court
opinions describing the murder often serve to evoke anger at the perpe-
trator;14 how could they not? However, when I was intent on zealously
representing my client, I did not want to dwell on the facts of the murder;
consequently, I avoided looking at the 8 x 10 glossy color photographs of
the victims. A violent death is a terrible scene of carnage; this was no less
true here. Rebecca Marquez was "killed by ligature strangulation and
had bite marks to the pubic area and right breast. [The medical exam-
iner] also found a bottle of cologne inside Rebecca Marquez's rectum.
Testing revealed the presence of sperm in Rebecca Marquez's vagina."
15
The pictures showed these violations in graphic detail-they were bloody,
frightening, and horrible.
Despite my intention to look at the pictures quickly and dispassion-
ately, I sat and wept. Looking at the pictures, I hated my client, not only
for what he had done, but for who he was. I had exactly the reaction the
prosecution anticipates jurors will have when they see photographs of the
murder.
When I left the District Attorney's office I drove to the county jail to
visit Marquez. I thought about not going-I was not over the pain of the
photographs. But, I had promised him I would see him, and I knew that
mattered to him, so I went. It was probably a mistake. I sat there talking
to him, seeing him as a brutal killer, yet hearing his halting, frightened
voice tell me the problems he was having adjusting to the routine of the
Bexar County Jail (compared to the death row prison) and how his family
members had not yet kept their promises to come visit. I did not tell him
I saw the pictures of his crimes. I did not see the point in divulging this
information, except perhaps, to unleash my anger. I was not prepared or
able to reconcile the murderer with the person I knew as my client. Yet,
as his lawyer, that is exactly what I had to do.
14. See Robin West, Narrative, Responsibility and Death: A Comment on the Death
Penalty Cases from the 1989 Term, 1 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 168-72 (1990)
(analyzing how the conservative majority on the United States Supreme Court uses "the
powerful rhetorical force of narrative as a means of assigning responsibility for the violent
crime .... [A]cts that in their brutality are almost impossible to fathom.").
15. See Marquez v. State, 725 S.W.2d 217, 221-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc)
(describing Marquez's autopsy results).
[Vol. 29:981
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These are the stories of violence that inform my thinking about the
connection between feminism and the death penalty. One story tells of
the violence inflicted on Marquez as a child, including the incessant abuse
from his father; both parents abandoning him as an adolescent; his own
massive drug use to block the pain of his frightening circumstances; and
his brain damage and mental retardation that compounded his difficulty
in reasonably coping with daily living. The other story consists of the
violence Marquez inflicted on others as an adult: beating and abusing the
women he lived with, killing his niece and his wife. The first story of
violence does not excuse the second. But to consider the appropriateness
of the death penalty for someone like Marquez, we cannot ignore his his-
tory and how it contributed to his commission of the crime. To under-
stand the connection between his past and the murder, we need to
examine the way the law recognizes and responds to his history of vio-
lence, both as a child and as an adult. Drawing this connection will ex-
plain how, as a feminist, one can both despise the crimes of violence
Marquez committed but also believe that he should not be sentenced to
death for them.
III. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCES
OF VIOLENCE
Feminist legal theory and death penalty jurisprudence both address
how the law responds to individual stories of personal violence perpe-
trated by a man against a woman. Twenty-five years ago each theory was
in a nascent stage, poised to define new ways of looking at central legal
issues in our culture: the appropriate imposition of the death penalty and
the proper response to crimes of violence against women. Although each
has had a different focus-feminist legal theory with changing the law,
and death penalty jurisprudence with identifying the constitutional con-
tours of existing law-they both teach us important lessons about the
need to situate individual experiences of violence in their broader social
context.
A. Feminist Legal Theory and Lawmaking 6
Feminism has instigated dramatic changes in how the legal system re-
gards violence against women, especially battering. In the main, these
16. I borrow this phrase from Elizabeth M. Schneider who uses it to refer to the
practice by which feminist advocates seek to transform the law. See Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Feminist Lawmaking and Historical Consciousness: Bringing the Past into the
Future, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 1, 7 (1994) (describing how feminist lawmaking has
shaped the law differently). This terminology provides an important way to recognize that
feminism affects not only the theory but also the practice of law. See Hon. Karen Burstein,
1998]
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acts are no longer considered private disputes or the woman's fault, but
criminal violations of public laws. These changes have been brought
about through two related endeavors: feminists actively working to
change the laws and how they are enforced, and the development of femi-
nist legal theory that has challenged the presumed gender-neutrality of
the law.1 7 At the same time, the progress made has been limited by a
narrow view of who battered women are and what is needed to end their
abuse.
Twenty-five years ago, it was not a crime in most states for a husband
to rape his wife. 18 Physical abuse of a woman by her husband was rarely
seen as a matter that the police should investigate, that the prosecutor
should charge, or that the courts should punish.' 9 Often when a woman
was beaten by her husband, society considered it a "private" matter in
which the law should not interfere.2 ° Women who were beaten by their
husbands were encouraged, or expected, to stay in the marriage despite
the abuse.2' When a woman managed to leave her abusive husband, few
Naming Violence: Destroying the Myth, 58 ALB. L. REV. 961, 968 (1995) (describing the
role of feminism in the 1970s in effecting state-wide legislation on spousal abuse in New
York).
17. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectics of Rights and Politics: Perspectives
from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 642-48 (1986) (describing the inter-
relationship of feminist politics and the development of feminist legal theory regarding the
legal treatment of battered women); D. Kelly Weisberg, Introduction to FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY at xv, xvii-xviii (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) (observing that feminist legal theory
has "two major components," a critique of gender and law and the application of that
critique to specific areas of the law).
18. See Leigh Bienen, Rape Ill-National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation,
6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 170, 185 (1980) (noting that in the mid-1970s all states sanctioned
the common law marital rape exception). In 1977, Oregon became the first state to repeal
the spousal exemption. See id. (commenting that this change took place only after reform
lobbyists and advocates pressured the lawmakers).
19. See, e.g., DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 87-118 (1976) (discussing the failure of
the legal system to address spousal abuse); Sue E. Eisenberg & Patricia L. Micklow, The
Assaulted Wife: "Catch 22" Revisited, 3 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 138, 156-59 (1977) (illus-
trating the barriers an abused wife faces from the time she calls the police until a possible
criminal trial); Laurie Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 5 WOMEN'S RTs. L.
REP. 7, 9-11 (1978) (explaining how the police, the prosecutors, the judge, and the court
itself "play a part in keeping these [abused] women prisoners of their violent husbands").
20. See DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 15-24 (1976) (characterizing wife-abuse as a
publicly taboo issue by the news media, governmental, and social agencies in the 1970s);
Sue E. Eisenberg & Patricia Mickow, The Assaulted Wife: "Catch 22" Revisited, 3 WO-
MEN'S RTS. L. REP. 138, 145 (1977) (explaining that domestic violence was seen as an issue
between the spouses and not a criminal matter).
21. See DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 79-86 (1976) (discussing social expectations
and financial pressures that cause a woman to stay with her husband); Rev. Katherine
Hancock Ragsdale, The Role of Religious Institutions in Responding to the Domestic Vio-
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shelters existed for her to seek protection."2 If the abuse caused a woman
to fear for her life, and she killed her husband, the law did not recognize
how her experience as a woman, and as a battered woman, might affect
her perceptions of the danger.23
The situation today is quite different from twenty-five years ago. 24 It is
a crime in many states for a husband to rape his wife. 5 Many police
departments and prosecutor's offices recognize that physical violence
within a family is a serious crime against which women should be pro-
tected and for which men should be prosecuted. 6 More shelters exist
where women and their children may seek protection when they flee their
abusive husbands.27 The experience and perspective of a battered wo-
lence Crisis, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1149, 1152-56 (1995) (describing how theology has been used
to sanction battering).
22. DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 197-216 (1976) (describing the only seven shel-
ters that existed in this country in 1976).
23. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 606-10 (1986) (describing the development of
the theory of a woman's "equal right to trial" that challenged the sex-bias of the law in self-
defense cases); Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women Who
Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 149
passim (1978) (explaining how to challenge the state of the law at trial).
24. See generally Katherine M. Schelong, Domestic Violence and the State: Responses
to and Rationales for Spousal Battering, Marital Rape & Stalking, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 79
passim (1994) (providing an historical background on the treatment of battered women
including America in the colonial period, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in order to
focus on the current legal and social status of women who are victims of domestic vio-
lence); Evan Stark, Re-presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to
Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 976-78 (1995) (discussing the progress since the
1970s in the social and legal response to battered women).
25. See Linda Jackson, Note, Marital Rape: A Higher Standard Is in Order, 1 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 183, 194-97 (1994) (reporting that as of 1994, seventeen states had
completely abolished the marital rape exemption; except for two that are silent on the
issue, the others retain some form of the exemption based on, for example, limiting marital
rape to lesser degrees of sexual assault or requiring that the victim sustain serious physical
injury).
26. See Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1498, 1515-18, 1535-41 (1993) (discussing the development of local programs that
coordinate police, prosecutors and court responses to battered women and the use of
mandatory arrest and "no-drop" policies for prosecuting batterers). But see Miriam H.
Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of Race and Gender in
Domestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 171, 191-94 (1994) (analyzing racist
application of mandatory arrest policies).
27. Compare, for example, the fact that in 1976 seven shelters existed in the country,
and that in 1995 over 1000 shelters existed nationwide. See DEL MARTIN, BATT-ERED
WIVES 197-216 (1976) (focusing on a handful of shelters for women in the early 1970s);
Evan Stark, Re-presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive
Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 977 (1995) (recognizing that since the early 1970s, "[o]ver
1000 shelters have opened and are currently receiving public funds").
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man is more often recognized as a legitimate factor if she claims self-
defense when charged with killing her husband.28
An important part of creating these changes has been the flourishing of
feminist legal scholarship that questions and exposes the sex-based bias
of the law.29 In the domestic violence area, feminist scholars' theoretical
work has transformed the legal recognition given to a battered woman's
claim of self-defense used against her husband's threat of imminent bod-
ily harm.3" Scholars have exposed the fallacy of the assumption that a
woman may safely escape the abuse if she would only leave the abuser.
In a ground-breaking article, Martha R. Mahoney documented and ana-
lyzed the phenomenon of men pursuing, terrorizing, and often killing wo-
men who tried to leave them, in addition to discussing the legal system's
inability to protect women in that situation.
31
Despite the progress that has been made, the protection of women
from violence by an intimate is still woefully inadequate.32 Although we
28. See, e.g., Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self Defense: Myths and Miscon-
ceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379 passim (1991) (analyzing
how battered women's self-defense claims may be considered under traditional self-de-
fense doctrine, but also examining how judicial attitudes may not properly understand the
claim).
29. See D. Kelly Weisberg, Introduction to FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY at xv, xvii (D.
Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) (suggesting that "[f]eminist jurisprudence ... provides an analy-
sis and critique of women's position in patriarchal society and examines the nature and
extent of women's subordination. It explores the role of law in maintaining and perpetuat-
ing patriarchy."); APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN'S LIVES passim
(D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996) (presenting articles and cases exploring sex bias in areas of
sexuality, violence, employment, and reproduction).
30. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self Defense: Myths and Misconcep-
tions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 406-37 (1991) (analyzing bat-
tered women's self-defense claims); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and
Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 607-10 (1986)
(describing the development and legal recognition of battered women's self-defense
claims); see also APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN'S LIVES 277-401
(D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996) (discussing the development of feminist theories of violence
and excerpting leading articles about the law and battered women).
31. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue
of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 passim (1991) (discussing the legal implications of do-
mestic violence as well as some of the surrounding issues). Mahoney created the phrase
"separation assault" to describe an "attack on the women's body and volition in which her
partner seeks to prevent her from leaving, retaliate for the separation, or force her to
return." Id. at 67 (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), as an example).
32. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED SURVEY 1 (Aug. 1995) (reporting that
"[wiomen were about six times more likely than men to experience violence committed by
an intimate"). One commentator characterizes the problem as an epidemic. See Linda L.
Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The Afri-
can-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1003, 1017;
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now recognize the harm of abuse, the primary focus is on protecting wo-
men once they are battered, not on keeping men from battering in the
first place.33 Even that protection is not enough: too few shelters exist;34
law enforcement is not consistent or effective; 35 and women who try to
leave may still be killed by their husbands.
36
see also Isabel Marcus, Reframing "Domestic Violence": Terrorism in the Home, in THE
PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 11, 23 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne
Mykituik eds., 1994) (reporting that in court-ordered education classes for batterers, men
continue to express belief that they are "in charge," and surprise that they were arrested
for beating their partners).
33. See Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition:
Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CI. LEGAL F. 23, 52-57 (arguing that
the legal system should change its focus from assuming that the way to protect a woman is
for her to leave her home, to addressing how to stop the abuse in the first place); Evan
Stark, Re-presenting Women Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Con-
trol, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 981 (1995) (arguing that Battered Woman Syndrome assumes
violent acts occur and "discourages theorizing about 'why does he do it?"').
34. See Cal Streeter, Texas Domestic Violence Needs Assessment Project (last modified
Sept. 29, 1997) <http://www.utexas.edu/depts/sswork/faculty/streeter/tdvna.html> (report-
ing that in 1996 sixty-four Texas state-funded shelters denied 5,359 requests for shelter
from adults and children fleeing domestic violence due to a lack of space); see also S. REP.
No. 101-545, at 38-39 (1990) (noting that as a nation we invest more in pets than women,
evidenced by the existence of three times as many animal shelters than battered women
shelters); Joyce Klemperer, Programs for Battered Women-What Works?, 58 ALB. L.
REV. 1171, 1179 (1995) (discussing insufficiency of shelters in New York where "[i]n 1992,
12,305 women were served and 25,000 women were turned away for lack of space");
Donna E. Shalala, Domestic Violence Is Not a Private Matter: A Comprehensive Approach
to Preventing and Ending the Violence, 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 29, 35 (1995) (noting the
dearth of shelters in big cities like Los Angeles as well as in rural communities).
35. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED Survey 4 (Aug. 1995) (stating that "[i]n 1992
approximately 28% of female victims of homicide (1,414 women) were known to have
been killed by their husband, ex-husband, or boyfriend"); see also H.R. REP. No. 103-395,
at 27-28 (1993) (citing reports studying gender bias in state courts that document prosecu-
tors who continue to refuse to pursue complaints of battering and judges who regard such
complaints as trivial); Joyce Klemperer, Programs for Battered Women-What Works?, 58
ALB. L. REV. 1171, 1178-79 (1995) (noting that in New York, incarceration of batterers is
still the exception); Lynn Hecht Schafran, There's No Accounting for Judges, 58 ALB. L.
REV. 1063, 1066-68 (1995) (discussing judges who are dismissive of domestic violence and
efforts to educate judges about the issue); Donna E. Shalala, Domestic Violence Is Not a
Private Matter: A Comprehensive Approach to Preventing and Ending the Violence, 26 U.
WEST L.A. L. REV. 29, 34 (1995) (citing example of model coordinated program in Quincy,
Massachusetts, but noting the rarity of such programs).
36. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue
of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 71-75 (1991) (discussing cases where the husband killed
the wife after she left him); Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Dis-
count: A Study of Capital Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507,
1517 (1996) (reporting that in six states studied, "nearly one-half of the men killed in retali-
ation for a woman's leaving a sexual relationship").
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Even within feminist legal theory, some have questioned the extent of
progress made in addressing domestic violence.37 These critiques recog-
nize the value of the work that has been done in changing the legal posi-
tion of domestic violence while at the same time identifying critical ways
in which cultural and legal barriers continue to hinder the protection of
women.
One of these critiques identifies the ways in which those seeking legal
reform, as well as the legal system itself, fail to acknowledge how race
differently affects a woman's experience of battering.38 Kimberle Cren-
shaw revealed how feminist reform efforts have marginalized women of
color.3 9 She examined how those working for legal change have ignored
structural barriers such as racial discrimination in employment and hous-
ing that may compound the difficulties a woman faces in leaving her abu-
sive home; n° cultural beliefs that may work to suppress the idea that it is
acceptable to leave;4' and policies of domestic violence programs that
may exclude women, for example, when a shelter refuses to admit a wo-
man because she is not fluent in English, thus leaving her without a place
of protection.4" Linda L. Ammons has explored how racial stereotypes
may preclude a battered African-American woman's self-defense claim
37. See Evan Stark, Re-presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syn-
drome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 975-1026 (1995) (positing that Battered
Woman Syndrome should focus on the coercion and control that batterers exercise because
the standard psychological trauma model fails to account for many women's experiences of
abuse). See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of
Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520 (1992)
(arguing that the feminist legal framework on battered women needs to reconceptualize
the experience of battered women within the context of violence in other intimate relation-
ships and as part of the general societal subordination of women).
38. See, e.g., Sharon Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black
Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 191 passim (1991); Linda L. Ammons, Mules,
Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American Wo-
man and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1003 passim; Kimberle Cren-
shaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 ST AN. L. REV. 1241 passim (1991); Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence
Against Latinas By Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Dif-
ferentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231 passim (1994); Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Femi-
nist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of Race and Gender in Domestic Violence
Policy, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 171 passim (1994).
39. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1251-65 (1991).
40. See id. at 1245-46.
41. See id. at 1253-57 (explaining that minority communities' attempts to maintain
community integrity and to minimize political costs of exposing gender violence have
stymied minority women's efforts to leave abusive homes).
42. See id. at 1262-63.
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from being considered legitimate.43 She demonstrates how cultural and
historical myths about African-Americans in general, and women in par-
ticular, as being inherently violent, or enjoying violence, may affect a ju-
ror's ability to properly judge an African-American woman defendant
when her defense includes Battered Woman Syndrome testimony. 4 The
importance of understanding the ways in which sex and race intersect in
the context of domestic violence cannot be underestimated-as Cren-
shaw pointed out, "it is sometimes a deadly serious matter of who will
survive-and who will not."
45
While the physical abuse of women in the home has moved from a
private to a public concern, from a matter ignored to one worthy of inter-
vention by the police and prosecution by the state, the lives of women are
still at risk at the hands of their intimate partners. A major part of the
problem is that our priorities do not seek to prevent the problem of
abuse; rather, society seeks to punish the perpetrator after the fact, and
then not always successfully.4 6 Yet, until we focus on stopping abuse
from occurring in the first place, we will not put an end to this kind of
life-threatening violence against women. A critical part of that necessary
change of focus is understanding what contributed to the man becoming
violent, not as an excuse for any given instance of abuse, but for what it
may reveal about the origins of violence in our culture.
B. Death Penalty Jurisprudence and Defense Practice
In death penalty jurisprudence it is constitutionally indispensable for
the sentencer to consider the individual circumstances of the defendant in
determining whether to sentence him to life imprisonment or death.47 As
43. See Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and
Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 Wis.
L. Rav. 1003 passim.
44. See id. at 1045-70. Ammons proposes that voir dire should include asking poten-
tial jurors about their racial and gender biases, and experts should address not only the
psychology of abuse but also the cultural myths that surround African-American women
and violence. See id. at 1074-75.
45. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1265 (1991).
46. See, e.g., Symposium on Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1
(1992) (presenting results of experiments across the country that studied the effects of
mandatory arrests for batterers and critiques of the experiments' narrow focus on arrest,
including lack of follow through in the criminal justice system, and failure to take into
account the broader legal and social context of the violence).
47. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112, 113-15 (1982) (noting that "consis-
tency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false consistency," and holding that
the jury may not be precluded from considering an individual defendant's character and
record); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976) (holding that the Constitution re-
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the United States Supreme Court recognized in 1976, a process that ex-
cludes consideration of "the possibility of compassionate or mitigating
factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind" fails to treat
each defendant as a "uniquely individual human being."48 Much of de-
fense practice in the past twenty-five years has been devoted to taking
seriously the import of examining the mitigating aspects of a defendant's
character and background. Despite the Court's retrenchment on how the
jury may consider mitigating evidence, defense attorneys have persisted
in bringing the reality of defendants' lives into the punishment calculus.
The investigation of individual defendants' lives has resulted in the identi-
fication of similar histories and experiences; these similar histories should
have far-reaching ramifications for how we address violence in our
society.
The requirement of individualized consideration of the appropriateness
of the death penalty arose in response to Furman v. Georgia4 9 in which a
majority of the Court held that then-existing death penalty statutory
schemes violated the Eighth Amendment because the death penalty was
applied arbitrarily and capriciously.50 In response to Furman, some states
adopted new death penalty statutes that attempted to remove the arbi-
trariness of the decision by making the death penalty mandatory for cer-
tain specified crimes.51 When the Court revisited the constitutionality of
the death penalty in 1976 it held that these statutes were unconstitutional
for several reasons, including the fact that they did not comport with con-
temporary social values that acknowledged that not all crimes warranted
the same punishment; did not eliminate the possibility of arbitrary deci-
sions at the guilt phase that would operate to exclude the imposition of
the death penalty; and did not allow for consideration of the proper pun-
quires the consideration of the "character and propensities of the offender"); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) (holding that the death penalty is unconstitu-
tional if it is mandatory).
48. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. To ensure that the defendant's individual character and
background receive their proper consideration, the decision about the appropriateness of
the death penalty is made in a separate hearing from that in which the jury determines the
defendant's guilt. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (recognizing that a bifurcated proceeding is the best method to
protect against arbitrary and capricious death sentences).
49. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
50. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 240-374 (concurring opinions of Douglas, Brennan, Stew-
art, White, Marshall, JJ.).
51. See, e.g., Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331-32 (describing the circumstances under which
the Louisiana statute automatically imposed death); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286 (describing
the North Carolina mandatory death penalty statute).
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ishment for the individual defendant. 52 The Court recognized that be-
cause death is a punishment different from all others, the jury's
determination of whether it was appropriate punishment required greater
reliability.53 Thus, as a constitutional matter, the death penalty may not
be mandatory and its imposition must allow for the consideration of the
defendant's individual character, record, and background.
In the years following Furman and Woodson, the Court has signifi-
cantly eroded the principle of individualized consideration. Most re-
cently, the Court in Buchanan v. Angelone,54 held that the Constitution
does not require the trial court to instruct the jury on the meaning of
mitigation or on the particular mitigating circumstances that are present
in an individual case.55 While a state may not limit what the jury consid-
ers as mitigating evidence, the Court has held that no constitutional re-
strictions exist on how the state may instruct the jury to consider that
evidence.56 All that is constitutionally required is that a juror be able to
give some mitigating weight to the evidence.57 Moreover, it is not uncon-
stitutional to require that the jury consider only mitigating evidence that
it finds the defense has proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
58
Jurors need not even consider whether the defendant deserves the death
penalty-it is constitutional for a statute to require the imposition of the
death penalty if the jury finds one aggravating circumstance but no miti-
gating circumstances.59 Finally, jurors may hear evidence about the im-
pact of the victim's death on the family and the community.6°
52. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334-36 (1976) (explaining that the Louisi-
ana death penalty statutes were unconstitutional for similar reasons as found in Woodson);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288-304 (1976) (summarizing why mandatory
death penalty statutes are unconstitutional).
53. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (determining that due to the qualitative difference
between life sentences and the death penalty, there is a corresponding need for reliability
in determining death is the appropriate punishment).
54. 118 S. Ct. 757 (1998).
55. See id. at 761-63.
56. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 373 (1993) (concluding that the Court has
consistently rejected the proposition that a state cannot "structure the consideration of
mitigating evidence").
57. See id. at 372.
58. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649-50 (1990) (plurality opinion) (reasoning
that "a defendant's constitutional rights are not violated by placing on him the burden of
proving mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency").
59. See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306-08 (1990) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment does not require jurors to consider "whether the severity of [the defendant's]
aggravating circumstance warranted the death sentence"; as long as the death penalty stat-
ute limits who is death eligible and allows consideration of mitigation, it is constitutional).
60. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825-26 (1991) (holding that a state may
decide that the jury should hear about "the specific harm caused by the defendant").
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However beleaguered, the concept of individualization remains a core
principle of death penalty jurisprudence and one that is important for
thinking about representing a man on death row for killing a woman with
whom he had a history of abuse. Mandating individualized consideration
of the defendant is a rather extraordinary, and yet critical, requirement.
Just at that moment when jurors are probably least inclined to consider
who the defendant is, and would rather immediately impose punishment
for the awful crime of which they convicted the defendant, the Court re-
quires them to listen to evidence about the defendant's life.6 ' While the
guilt phase of a capital trial is about whether the defendant committed
the crime, the punishment phase entails a broader inquiry about what
punishment is appropriate in light of the circumstances of the crime as
well as the defendant's history, character, and uniqueness as a human
being.62 It is, in many ways, about the meaning and value of the defend-
ant's life.63 As the Court has observed, "the sentence imposed at the
penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's
background, character and crime. ,64
In the years since Furman, the requirement of individualization has re-
sulted in the development of extraordinary information about the charac-
teristics and backgrounds of those who are sentenced to death.65
61. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.10 (1982) (noting that "the sen-
tencer must listen" to mitigating evidence).
62. See, e.g., Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Death worthiness: Differ-
entiating Between Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 21
passim (1997) (explaining the difference between the guilt and punishment phase inquiries
and analyzing how courts conflate the two).
63. See, e.g., Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 303 (1983) (characterizing the penalty phase
as a "trial for life"); Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories
and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 561 (1995) (describing a capital
penalty trial as a unique legal forum "to tell the truth about the lives of capital defend-
ants"); Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305, 361 (stating that
"[t]he overall goal of the defense is to present a human narrative, an explanation of the
defendant's apparently malignant violence as in some way rooted in understandable as-
pects of the human condition").
64. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S.
538, 543 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis deleted)).
65. Unfortunately, this information is often not discovered prior to trial or presented
to the jury. Rather, it is uncovered after the defendant has been sentenced to death and
his new lawyers on post-conviction review engage in the kind of investigation that should
have been done by his trial lawyers. The reasons for this neglect largely have to do with
the poor quality of trial counsel and the limited resources they are provided. See, e.g.,
A.B.A. SEC. IND. RTS. AND RESP., Report in Support of A.B.A. Recommendation calling
for a moratorium on carrying out the death penalty (the report cites the widespread lack of
properly funded, competent counsel as one reason for the moratorium; the recommenda-
tion was approved Feb. 3, 1997); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sen-
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Disturbing patterns have emerged as lawyers have investigated their cli-
ents' backgrounds and worked with experts to understand the signifi-
cance of these histories. Craig Haney, a professor of psychology and a
leading expert on the social histories of capital defendants, has observed
that, while twenty years ago little was known about capital defendants,
we now know that "the nexus between poverty, childhood abuse and ne-
glect, social and emotional dysfunction, alcohol and drug abuse, and
crime is so tight in the lives of many capital defendants as to form a kind
of social historical 'profile."' 66 Other researchers have found similar pat-
terns among individuals on death row, including histories of severe child
abuse, mental illness or retardation, neurological impairments, and pov-
erty.67 In this context, Mario Marquez's life history is not an aberration
but an all too common reality for defendants sentenced to death.
The significance of information about the backgrounds of defendants
like Marquez is not simply that it exists factually, but that it provides
insight into the factors and experiences that contributed to an individual
defendant's violent behavior.68 Social scientists tell us that the interac-
tence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1837-41
(1994) (presenting numerous examples of inadequate lawyering at capital trials); Douglas
W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death
Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 377-412 (1995) (examining how systemic underfunding of
indigent defense services negatively affects death penalty trials nationwide).
66. Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic
of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 580 (1995).
67. See, e.g., Marilyn Feldman et al., Filicidal Abuse in the Histories of 15 Condemned
Murderers, 14(7) BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 345 passim (1986) (describing the
family characteristics of fifteen death row inmates and exploring the ways in which physical
and/or sexual abuse may contribute to their violent behaviors); Dorothy Otnow Lewis et
al., Psychiatric, Neurological and Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15 Death Row In-
mates in the United States, 143(7) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838 passim (1986) (documenting the
results from a clinical evaluation of fifteen death row inmates and concluding that "many
condemned individuals probably suffer unrecognized severe psychiatric, neurological, and
cognitive disorders relevant to considerations of mitigation"); Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al.,
Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational and Family Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned
to Death in the United States, 145(5) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584, 588-89 (May 1988) (explain-
ing that "homicidal adolescents sentenced to death have had to cope with brain dysfunc-
tion, cognitive limitations, severe psychopathogy, and violent, abusive households");
Michael Mello, On Metaphors, Mirrors, and Murders: Theodore Bundy and the Rule of
Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 887, 919 n.162 (1990-91) (citing authorities docu-
menting that most defendants on death row grew up in poverty and many are illiterate,
mentally retarded, and/or mentally ill); see also Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse and
Adult Murder: Implications for the Death Penalty, 77 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar.
1999) (manuscript at 15-24 on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal) (discussing social sci-
ence literature on the long-term consequences of childhood abuse and the prevalence of
childhood abuse among death row inmates).
68. See Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder. Social Histories and the
Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 561-62 (1995) (explaining that "these
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tion of childhood abuse, mental illness, mental retardation, and/or brain
damage may impair a person's ability to make appropriate decisions, ra-
tional judgments, or reasoned choices, especially in stressful situations.69
At the punishment phase in an individual case, this kind of information
may explain, without excusing, why the defendant committed the crime,
by placing it in the context of his background and character.70
Individual stories of a defendant's life history of violence and despair
may move a juror to believe that a life sentence is a sufficient punish-
ment. At the same time, the prevalence of these kinds of devastating
histories among defendants on death row should make us question the
role of our criminal justice system, social services, and educational institu-
tions.7 1 When so many individuals who are subjected to childhood vio-
stories-and what they tell us about the roots of violence-can assist our understanding of
capital murder, provide a framework for comprehending a single, violent social his-
tory. .. "); see also Pamela Y. Blake et al., Neurologic Abnormalities in Murderers, 45 NEU-
ROLOGY 1641, 1646 (1995) (concluding that the "interaction of abuse, paranoia, and
neurologic dysfunction provides a matrix of violence"); Dorothy Otnow Lewis, From
Abuse to Violence: Psychophysiological Consequences of Maltreatment, 31(3) J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 383 (1992), reprinted in ANNUAL PROGRESS IN
CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND DEVELOPMENT 507, 519 (Margaret E. Hertzig & Ellen A. Farber
eds., 1993) (positing that the presence of neuropsychiatric and cognitive deficits in a person
who was abused as a child create a "matrix for violence").
69. See, e.g., Pamela Y. Blake et al., Neurologic Abnormalities in Murderers, 45 NEU-
ROLOGY 1641, 1646 (1995); Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Toward a Theory of the Genesis of
Violence: A Follow Up Study of Delinquents, 28(3) J. Am. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 431 (1989), reprinted in ANNUAL PROGRESS IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND DE-
VELOPMENT 547, 557-59 (Stella Chess & Margaret E. Hertzig eds., 1990). See generally
Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for the Death Pen-
alty, 77 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 1999) (manuscript at 15-24 on file with the St.
Mary's Law Journal) (discussing long-term consequences of childhood abuse and their in-
teraction with other disabilities that negatively affect a person's judgment and behavior).
70. See, e.g., Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and
the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 560-61, 608-09 (1995) (discussing
how social histories of capital defendants help explain why they should not be sentenced to
death); Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness: Differentiating
Between Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 21, 31-33
(1997) (describing how mitigating evidence seeks to explain, not excuse, the defendant's
conduct).
71. See Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the
Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 562 (1995) (observing that individual
stories do more than tell us about the defendant's violent history, they "serve as the basis
for the development of a responsible social policy of violence prevention in lieu of the
mindless punitiveness with which our society has become recently enamored"); Margaret
Jane Radin, Proportionality, Subjectivity, and Tragedy, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1165,
1174-75 (1985) (arguing that the tragedy of violence represented by the death penalty
cannot be separated from "other circumstances that might just as readily be seen as tragic:
the persistence of racism, the persistence of a poverty-stricken underclass, and much else
about our society").
HeinOnline  -- 29 St. Mary's L.J. 1000 1997-1998
lence, who suffer from mental impairments or brain damage, and who are
not diagnosed or treated for those disabilities, come to the same grievous
fate of committing murder, we should be galvanized to reorder our social
and legal priorities. Rather than resorting to the death penalty as punish-
ment, we should focus on changing the identifiable conditions of others
similarly situated to those now on death row, to try to prevent them from
reaching the point of killing. In other words, we should not ignore what
the individual histories are telling us about the failures of our current
priorities and policies.
IV. RECONCILING VIOLENCE, OUTRAGE, AND COMPASSION
When a man kills a woman as part of a history of abuse, we are all
outraged and saddened by her death. The woman's death is tragic on a
personal level, but it also speaks directly to hearts of feminists on a polit-
ical level because it exemplifies a broader reality about the violence that
women suffer in our culture. A woman's death at the hands of her hus-
band confirms our fears about the full extent of harm women face from
men who beat them and it demonstrates the legal and social service sys-
tems' inability to deal effectively with the persistent problem of abuse
until it is too late.
These same impulses resonate in the hearts and minds of those of us
who represent the man who killed the woman. We understand the per-
sonal anguish of the victim's family, but we also see the individual tragedy
of the man who committed the murder.72 Far too often, the individual
defendant is someone who, like Mario Marquez, was brutally beaten as a
child, and as a consequence, may suffer long-term behavioral and percep-
tual impairments, or may be disabled by mental illness or mental retarda-
tion. None of these conditions necessarily provide a legal defense to his
conduct, but they help explain important aspects of his character and
72. Often, concern for the defendant is seen as eviscerating sorrow for the loss of the
victim's life. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Address to the City Club of Cleveland, Ohio
(WVIZ, November 7, 1997) (videotape on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal) (observing
that in the crime debate, "being for fairness [for the defendant] does not mean we're not
sympathetic to people who've lost a loved one or people who've been violated in some
way"). See generally SISTER HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING (1994) (describing
her experience of working with men on death row and families of murder victims and the
emotional tension and confusion that created especially for victims' families who thought
she could not do both). A fundamental challenge to both those who seek the death pen-
alty and those who are opposed to it should be to find a way to treat with equal seriousness
the defendant's commission of the murder and his mitigating circumstances. See id. at 145
(identifying her own emotional confusion over thinking about the victim's family's needs
and the victim's murderer at the same time); see also id. at 175 (discussing the difficulty in
"not wavering intellectually" in her opposition to the death penalty while also wanting to
comfort the victim's family but "feeling guilty" that she was only "adding to their pain").
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background that are relevant to whether he should be sentenced to life
imprisonment or death. Moreover, these factors suggest a powerful in-
dictment of our legal, social, and educational systems that failed to recog-
nize and treat these disabilities at a point in time when it could have
made a difference.
These two views of the violence associated with the killing of a woman
who was physically abused by her partner may be reconciled by taking
seriously the imperative of individualization and by placing the murder in
the broader social context of our society's failure to address decisively
family violence and mental disabilities. These must be considered to-
gether: Contemplating individual circumstances of violence alone ignores
the substantial role our social and legal systems play in affecting individ-
ual lives; yet, viewing the role of society alone fails to acknowledge the
importance of individual responsibility for one's violent actions. Sepa-
rately, neither is complete nor satisfactory; in unison, they contribute to a
deeper understanding of violence in our culture. 3
A. Considering Men on Death Row As Individuals
Individualization allows for the consideration of "the possibility of
compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of
humankind."74 In a death penalty case, defense attorneys investigate the
defendant's background, record, and character to uncover the explana-
tion for the defendant's behavior." They seek to learn the critical details
73. See Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder. Social Histories and the
Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 580 (1995) (maintaining the importance
in death penalty cases of emphasizing "something lost sight of in most legal analyses of
criminal behavior: context"); Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility,
and Angry Young Men: Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 433, 459 (1996) (arguing that "we must insure that our assess-
ments of criminal responsibility are not completely disconnected from the context in which
people commit crime"). This linkage is consistent with feminist theory. See Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 603 (1986) (explaining "Feminist theory thus reveals the social
dimension of individual experience and the individual dimension of social experience....
It values the dynamic relationship of the individual and the community.").
74. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
75. See, e.g., Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 317-37 (1983) (discussing how investigation
of a defendant's life is critical to the entire case, in particular the punishment phase where
the defendant must show how his crime was understandable in light of his history); Craig
Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of Mitigation,
35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 560-83 (1995) (demonstrating the importance of explaining
the crime in light of the defendant's history and positing, "I know of no psychological
principle that disconnects past from the present within a single social history"); David C.
Stebbins & Scott P. Kenney, Zen and the Art of Mitigation Presentation, of the Use of
[Vol. 29:9811002
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of the defendant's life that can assist the jury in making comprehensible
the incomprehensible commission of the murder. It is often difficult for
many people to see beyond the crime itself in thinking about the punish-
ment the defendant deserves, 76 even though it is constitutionally neces-
sary.77 In the context of a man killing a woman as part of a history of
physical violence, it may be especially hard for a feminist to do so.
Yet, feminist scholarship itself provides ways for thinking about the
male defendant in a different light. First, recall Crenshaw's critique that
by marginalizing women of color, domestic violence reforms are inade-
quate and at times detrimental.7" Crenshaw argued that the analysis of
battering had to be more inclusive.79 I suggest that the spirit of inclusivity
should be extended to include considering the individual circumstances of
the man who batters. In the death penalty context this does not mean
excusing the defendant's conduct such that he would not be found guilty,
but it does mean thinking seriously about whether life imprisonment is
his appropriate punishment.8" In the long run, our ability to consider the
Psycho-Social Experts in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Trial, CHAMPION, Aug. 1986, at 14,
16, 18 (explaining that the defendant must explain how and why events in a defendant's life
connect to the crime); Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305, 361
(noting that mitigating evidence should explain the crime). But see supra note 65 and ac-
companying text (discussing some of the reasons why mitigating evidence may not be in-
vestigated or presented to the jury).
76. See, e.g., William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Pre-
view of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1074-75 (1995) (citing studies that found jurors
focused on the crime in making their sentencing decisions); see also id. at 1087-92 (report-
ing that preliminary results of the Capital Jury Project show that many jurors contemplate
punishment when deciding guilt and that about one-third believed that if they found that
certain factors existed, e.g., the murder was heinous, they were required to sentence the
defendant to death).
77. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
80. I intentionally draw the line here between guilt and punishment because I believe
it is important to acknowledge that a defendant's criminal responsibility for the murder
does not determine his sentence. See Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and
Death worthiness: Differentiating Between Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty Cases, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 21, 28-55 (1997) (analyzing how the defendant's deathworthiness is
broader than his guilt-phase culpability). Some might see it as skirting the issue of whether
a defendant's circumstances might not be relevant to his guilt, even though that might
result in his acquittal. That is a critical question, and one with which other authors have
struggled. See Cookie Ridolfi, Statement on Representing Rape Defendants, in LEGAL ETH-
iCs 304, 304-05 (Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban eds., 1995) (explaining basis for her
"growing discomfort" representing rape defendants); Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility,
Social Responsibility, and Angry Young Men: Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense
Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 433, 447-48 (1996) (analyzing how an individ-
ual's and society's responsibilities for a crime should be relevant in criminal trials, against
backdrop of her own "mixed feelings" as a feminist and a criminal defense lawyer).
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man's life history will also further our understanding of violence against
women."s If we are willing to acknowledge the circumstances of a man's
life that played a role in his becoming the kind of man who beats a wo-
man, and not just punish him for the acts of abuse, then we may better
appreciate the importance of addressing those incipient conditions. This
change of focus would contribute mightily to preventing the abuse in-
stead of sentencing the abuser to death when the abuse escalated to
murder.
Second, a willingness to consider the individual history of the man who
batters and kills a woman may be a way to further establish the legitimacy
of feminist claims about the destructiveness of domestic violence. In
Feminist Legal Methods, Katharine T. Bartlett argued that feminists need
to pay attention to the methods we use when analyzing the perceived
inadequacies and biases of the law. 2 She maintained that feminists must
be willing to question the basis of their beliefs in order to better identify
the truth behind women's experience, for these experiences inform one's
politics.8 3 In other words, we must be willing to consider and seek to
understand perspectives contrary to our own. She suggested, for exam-
ple, that those who urge reform of rape laws must be willing to consider
the position of men who believe that some women "invite" the sexual
encounter.8 4 By listening to this differing perspective we may maintain
our beliefs, but also "consider the truths upon which [we] act subject to
further refinement, amendment, and correction.""5
81. This view may also, on a broader political scale, provide a way to change the focus
of the question from why the woman stays to why the man beats a woman in the first place.
82. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 passim
(1990).
83. See id. at 884 (noting "Positionality reconciles the existence of reliable, experi-
ence-based grounds for assertions of truth upon which politics should be based, with the
need to question and improve these grounds."); see also id. at 880 (explaining "The posi-
tional stance acknowledges the existence of empirical truths, values and knowledge, and
also their contingency. It thereby provides a basis for feminist commitment and political
action, but views these commitments as provisional and subject to further critical evalua-
tion and revision."); cf Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of
Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 527 (1992)
(maintaining that to create more effective change, the feminist critique of domestic vio-
lence must connect to the larger issue of violence in society and women's subordination in
society).
84. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 882
(1990).
85. Id. at 883. Admittedly, understanding the opposing perspective may not be easy,
but it is still necessary. See, e.g., id. at 887 (stating "A goal central to feminism [is] to be
engaged, with others, in a critical transformative process of seeking further partial knowl-
edges from one's admittedly limited habitat. This goal is the grounding of feminism, a
grounding that combines the search for further understandings and sustained criticism to-
1004 [Vol. 29:981
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When Bartlett introduced the example of rape reform she asked rhe-
torically, "can it get worse?".86 This question suggested that of all her
examples87 it might be most difficult for someone involved in rape reform
to listen to someone who still believes that a woman "asks for it." Argua-
bly, the question I struggle with in this Essay may be an example of how
it can get worse, and yet, why it is still necessary to engage in the
dialogue.
B. Placing Their Murders in Context
In addition to acknowledging the individual background and character
of the defendant, it is critical to consider the broader legal and social
context of the murder. Seeking the death penalty for the murder of a
woman that involved a history of abuse by the defendant shows that the
government is serious about prosecuting and punishing crimes of violence
against women to the full extent of the law. This action is important be-
cause often the apprehension exists that prosecutors and courts are more
lenient in their enforcement of the laws when presented with crimes of
violence against women.88
ward those understandings."); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1299 (1993)
(asserting "With identity thus reconceptualized, it may be easier to understand the need for
and summon the courage to challenge groups that are after all, in one sense, 'home' to us,
in the name of the parts of us that are not made at home. This takes a great deal of energy
and arouses intense anxiety."); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Chal-
lenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520,
527 (1992) (characterizing her argument about placing woman-abuse in a broader social
context as "controversial perhaps even heretical" but still necessary).
86. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 882
(1990).
87. Bartlett's two other examples involve prochoice advocates making an effort to
understand the views of those who are offended by the notion of unlimited choice and
those who debate joint custody appreciating that some fathers want to be "responsible, co-
equal parents." Id.
88. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27-28 (1993); Donna E. Shalala, Domestic
Violence Is Not a Private Matter: A Comprehensive Approach to Preventing and Ending the
Violence, 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 29, 34 (1995) (observing that the legal system does not
always consider battering as a serious crime); Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social
Responsibility, and Angry Young Men: Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer,
21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE, 433, 492 (1996) (questioning whether judges treat
crimes of violence against women with the same degree of seriousness as crimes of violence
against men). Rapaport argues that this concern is specifically justified with respect to
murders within the domestic violence context. Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and
the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49
SMU L. REV. 1507, 1519-30 (1996) (showing that in domestic murder cases where the
husband killed the woman who left him, appellate courts consider the murder "ordinary"
and therefore not deserving of the death penalty).
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It is also necessary to observe, however, that the seriousness displayed
once a woman is dead masks the lack of genuine attention to preventing
the crime from occurring in the first place. The allocation of resources in
this country favors prisons over social and educational programs8 9 that
could help a child like Marquez when he was beaten by his father, aban-
doned by his parents, or identified as mentally retarded, and an adult like
Marquez when he beat the women with whom he lived. We devote more
resources to prosecuting death penalty cases than providing shelter and
resources for women who want to leave their abusive husbands. 90 Basic
law enforcement programs that coordinate the arrest and prosecution of
batterers are still the exception.91 Inadequate resources for a battered
89. For example, in Texas, the 1995 budget for the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice (the state prison system) was approximately $3 million, while the 1995 budget for
the Department of Protective and Regulatory Services was approximately $500,000. See
Summary of the 1996-97 State Budget by Agency, Function and Fiscal Year Compared to
the 1994-95 Spending Level All Funds (last modified Dec. 8, 1995)
<http://www.lbb.state.tx.us/lbb/members/reports/fiscal/appendix/FSB5.htm>. Eighty-five
percent of the DPRS budget is allocated to Protective Services for Families and
Children (providing services to abused and neglected children and their families, foster
and adoptive parents, runaways, and other children at risk). See Department of
Protective and Regulatory Services (last modified Nov. 27, 1995)
<http://www.lbb.state.tx.us/lbb/members/reports/fiscal/fshhs/FS530.htm>; see also D. Stan-
ley Eitzen, Violent Crime: Myths, Facts, and Solutions, in TAKINC SIDES 331, 334 (Kurt
Finsterbusch & George McKenna eds., 1996) (observing that "eight years ago [in 1988]
Texas spent $7 on education for every dollar it spent on prisons. Now [in 1995] the ratio is
4 to 1. Meanwhile Texas ranks 37th among the states in per pupil spending.").
90. Direct comparisons are difficult to make. However, Texas spends approximately
$2.3 million on each death penalty case. Christy Hoppe, Executions Cost Texas Millions,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1992, at 1A (illustrating that the cost of life imprison-
ment is less than the cost of execution), available in 1992 WL 7103212. As of December 31,
1996, 438 persons were on death row in Texas, compared to 408 one year earlier (a year in
which seven were executed). BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1996 tbl. 5, at 6. In contrast, the State of Texas appropriated $1.8
million in FY 1998 to family violence shelters and programs. Fax Letter from Karen
Parker, Family Violence Program Administrator, Texas Department of Human Services, to
the author (Feb. 12, 1998) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal). Additionally, federal
funding of approximately $12 million was also allocated in FY 1998 for family violence
programs in Texas. See id.
91. See, e.g., Donna E. Shalala, Domestic Violence Is Not a Private Matter: A Compre-
hensive Approach to Preventing and Ending the Violence, 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 29, 34
(1995); Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1498, 1540 (1993) (emphasizing that prosecutors are reluctant to pursue domestic
violence cases due to the victim's tendency to drop the charges against the abuser).
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woman seeking protection may literally mean the difference between her
life and her death.92
The ability of the government to seek the death penalty against an abu-
sive husband who kills his wife should not assuage our outrage that the
murder occurred. It should, instead, offend us that our priorities do not
value the woman's life enough to make the investment in the kinds of
social, educational, and legal programs that might have kept her from
being abused and killed. We should be ashamed if we believe that impos-
ing the death penalty even begins to make up for our inattention not only
to the woman's abusive circumstances but also to the defendant's ne-
glected past.
V. CONCLUSION
The resolution of the conflict between being a feminist and represent-
ing a man on death row who killed a woman he had physically abused lies
in the importance of seeing the personal as political. A case like Mario
Marquez's tears at my heart because he brutally killed his wife and niece,
because his own life was so wretched, and because nothing in our legal or
social systems intervened, at any point, to stop the collision between his
disastrous impairments and his wife's life. Justice Brennan once wrote,
"the way in which we choose those who will die reveals the depth of
moral commitment among the living." 93 He wrote those words in the
context of a case about the racist application of the death penalty, but
they apply here as well. We should not isolate our anger at the violence
against a woman by thinking it impossible to represent, or understand, a
man on death row who killed that woman. The tragedy of the woman's
death and the tragedy of the defendant's life together reflect the devastat-
ing toll we take when, as a society, we fail to protect our children and we
fail to protect each other.
92. See, e.g., Alba v. State, 905 S.W.2d 581, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc)
(noting that on the day before she was killed, the defendant's wife had tried to find shelter
or treatment center for her and her children).
93. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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